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Privacy in the First Amendment
In the exercise of its traditional freedom, the press often discloses
information about individuals which those individuals would rather
conceal. When the information, though true, is particularly embar-
rassing or intimate, the person has sometimes felt sufficiently injured
to sue the offending publisher-even though the publisher committed
no physical intrusion, fraud or larceny to get the story. The claimed
legal injury in such cases therefore consists only in having private in-
formation become public without the consent of the person whom the
information concerns. When, in 1960, the late William Prosser sifted
some 300 cases having to do with privacy,1 he found that enough of
these suits had been successful to constitute a common law cause of
action.2 Prosser named the action "the public disclosure tort" and listed
it as one of four American common law torts which protect personal
privacy.3
Even as Prosser identified the public disclosure tort action, he recog-
nized that its existence might well interfere with the First Amendment
right of the press to report on matters of legitimate public interest.4
In the intervening decade the definition of what is "of legitimate pub-
lic interest" has rapidly expanded under a series of Supreme Court de-
cisions,5 to the point where it is difficult to say confidently that any
item of information which the press decides to publish is outside the
1. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
2. For examples of such suits, see note 20 & p. 1470 infra.
3. Prosser, supra note 1, at 392-98.
Prosser did not attempt an exact definition of the public disclosure tort in his analysis.
He described the tort generally as requiring that "something secret, secluded or privatepertaining to the plaintiff" be invaded and that the something be publicized, but not
requiring that the publication be false, or be for the commercial advantage of the de.
fendant. Id. at 407. However, the examples he offered are mostly cases which do not
fit neatly into the public disclosure category; the exception is Melvin v, Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). See Prosser, supra note 1, at 392-98. Except for California,
therefore, one finds it hard to say which states explicitly recognize the public disclosure
tort. Most courts which uphold a "right to privacy" refuse to specify their rationale.
Prosser himself ventures to identify only those states which recognize a privacy tort action
in general, without breaking the recognized action down into his separate categories.
Id. at 386-88. See also W. PROSSER, THE LAw oF ToR-s § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971). The
four categories, each depending on a different rationale and each punishing different
acts, are:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the Public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness.
Prosser, supra note 1, at 389.
4. Id. at 410.
5. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also pp. 1463-65 infra.
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protection of the First Amendment. 6 In all suits for public disclosure
of private information, publishers may well enjoy a complete defense
of privilege under the First Amendment. If this is true, then there can
be no constitutionally acceptable remedy for the injury caused by pub-
lishing private, true facts, and the public disclosure tort is unconstitu-
tional on its face-an inference some legal scholars have already drawn.7
However, the analytical premises of the Court do not lead necessarily
to that conclusion. Using the same premises, a First Amendment inter-
est can be shown in preserving the public disclosure tort remedy, based
on a First Amendment interest in the particular form of privacy which
the tort protects.
I
The starting point for constitutional arguments both for and against
the public disclosure tort is a theory of the First Amendment which the
Supreme Court has articulated over the last decade. Beginning with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" in 1964, the Court in applying the
free speech guarantee has stressed the integral role of free speech in a
democratic political system, and has uncovered a First Amendment
interest in protecting a "system of freedom of expression."" In deciding
the constitutionality of an individual utterance, therefore, the Court
has taken into account not only the merits of the specific utterance but
also its place in a constitutional system of speech. The Court's theory
rests on the premise that free speech provides citizens with that "access
to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences" '
which citizens require in order to perform "[s]elf-governance."1I
6. See p. 1468 & notes 27-31 infra.
7. See Marc Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in PrivacY Protection: Legal nhi.
bitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 107 (1964). Others who have recognized
the potential unconstitutionality of a public disclosure tort include T. E:.tmnso.v, THE
SYsTmm OF FREFDOM OF EXFREsFIo 517 (1970); Kalven, Pidvacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTUEMP. PROD. 526, 336 j1965). See also Kapellas
v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (199).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. The phrase is the title of Professor Thomas Emerson's stud) of the Supreme
Court's treatment of the First Amendment, T. E.tErasoN,, supra note 7. Emerson posits
that "[t]he root purpose of the First Amendment is to assure an effective system of
freedom of expression in a democratic society." Id. at 17.
The Court itself has said that "[a] broadly defined freedom of the press assurcs the
maintenance of our political system and an open society," Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389 (1967), and it has observed "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited .... ." New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Justice Black has called First Amendment guarantees
"the heart of the system on which our frcedom depends." American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,. 453 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
10. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
11. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971).
1465
The Yale Law Journal
As Mr. Justice Brennan has acknowledged, the Court has developed
its self-governance rationale for protecting an integrated system of First
Amendment freedoms in light of the work of the late Alexander
Meiklejohn. 12 In Meiklejohn's classic formulation,
The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak." It
protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communica-
tion by which we "govern." It is concerned, not with a private
right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.1
In other words, free speech is protected not for some intrinsic value of
speech but because it is a necessary condition for the making of in-
formed decisions about matters of government, decisions which all
citizens in a democracy are called on to make. Speech provides infor-
mation, the raw material from which citizens can make self-governing
choices.
Although the Court has never set out the elements of the free ex-
pression system, its operation would seem to require two separate stages.
Transmission of information from speaker to listener is only the first;
the second is the application of that information-in the mind of the
person who receives it-to the individual decisions of self-governance.1 4
Both stages of the process are needed to achieve what, in the Court's
view, the Constitution envisions: free individual choice by each citizen.
Yet the Court, in applying its concept of a free expression system,
has concerned itself almost solely with the first stage of that system-
the process of communicating information from speaker to listener. In
12. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965). Justice Black cites Meiklejohn in his concur-
rence in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 n.6 (1964).
13. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255.
Professor Emerson believes that a free expression system also serves the goals of indi.
vidual self-fulfillment and the discovery of truth, independent of their relationship to
governing process. T. EMRSON, supra note 7, at 6-7.
14. Although the Court has not hitherto viewed its system as involving two operative
stages, Justice Douglas appeared to recognize an analogous division of First Amendment
operation in his dissent in United States v. Caidwell, one of the three cases consolidated
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). After quoting from Meiklejohn, he argued:
Two principles which follow from this understanding of the First Amendment
are at stake here. One is that the people, the ultimate governors, must have abso.
lute freedom of, and therefore privacy of, their individual opinions and beliefs re-
gardless of how suspect or strange they may appear to others. Ancillary to that
principle is the conclusion that an individual must also have absolute privacy over
whatever information he may generate in the course of testing his opinions and
beliefs . . . . The second principle is that effective self-government cannot succeed
unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded, and uncensored
flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected to critique, re-
buttal, and reexamination.
Id. at 714-15. Douglas' first principle is analogous to the second stage proposed here,
and his second principle is analogous to the first stage.
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the context of that first stage, the Court has recognized that participa-
tion of individuals in a free expression system can be inhibited, or
chilled, in a variety of ways and that the result is to diminish the self-
governing rights of at least those individuals.1a It has therefore acted
in the name of the First Amendment to forestall those potential inhibi-
tory effects. But at the same time the Court has taken for granted the
freedom from potential inhibition of the second stage-the listener's
decision-making in light of received information-which begins after
the communication between speaker and listener is complete. The
Court's assumption seems to be that speech need only reach the listen-
er's ear for the free expression system of democracy to operate success-
fully.'6
Lamont v. Postmaster General'- illustrates the distinction between
inhibitions of the first stage and inhibitions of the second, and the
Court's unwillingness to perceive the latter. In Lamont, the Court
struck down a Post Office requirement that addressees of "Communist
propaganda" had to request the "propaganda" in writing before it
would be delivered. The Court's opinion focused on the hindrance to
free speech which the written request represented: the hindrance to
the successful act of communication between the person who mailed
the "propaganda" and the intended recipient.' 8 No mention was made
of the effect on the addressees of knowing that the Post Office had
identified them as recipients of subversive mail."' Knowing that they
had been so identified, they might be inhibited from making a later
self-governing choice, such as the choice to vote for a Communist politi-
cal candidate. Under the Lamont facts, that chilling effect (an inhibi-
tion of the free expression system's second stage) seems a more likely
and more worrisome possibility than the possibility that a written
request requirement might impede the flow of speech (a first-stage
inhibition). Yet the decision turns on the first-stage inhibition alone.
15. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). See also note
26 infra.
16. The Court has often used the phrase "the right to receive information and ideas"'
see, e.g., Kleindjenst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US.
557, 563 (1969). But it has invoked the right only to protect the act of communication
between speaker and listener;, the phrase has never been used to indicate an) hearer's
right to First Amendment protection in his subsequent decision-making. The "right to
receive" appears to apply only to the same circumstances as the right to speak; the
Court seems to use it as a substitute for the "right to speak" in cases where its sym-
pathies do not lie with the speaker. in1 Mandel, for example, the speaker was a Belgian
Marxist applying for permission to enter the United States; in Stanley the speakers were
makers of pornographic films.
17. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
18. Id. at 307.
19. At one point, the Post Office was keeping a central list of these recipients, al-
though it claimed to have discontinued the practice before trial. 381 U.S. at 303.
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A possible reason for the Court's disregard of the free expression
system's second stage is that the threat of inhibition to the second stage
is much harder to imagine than the threat of inhibition to the first. If
inhibition stems from public disapproval of unpopular beliefs, the
speaker in the first stage is obviously vulnerable. Many people know
what he believes, because he tells them. He invites antipathy, and per-
haps suppression. The second stage of the system, on the other hand,
takes place entirely within the mind of the individual, and in perform-
ing it the individual attracts no attention; lie is insulated from public
knowledge and potential disapproval. Perhaps a hostile public might
not like the decisions he was reaching and might want to inhibit him
from reaching such decisions, if it could know; but how would it find
out? The insulation of the individual against the chilling of his self-
governing decisions is thus his ability to prevent public knowledge
about himself.
Privacy is the name which the public disclosure tort cases give to the
individual's ability to control information about himself.20 And with
those cases, this concept of the nature of privacy is introduced into the
law. Privacy understood in this special sense-as control of information
about oneself-is prerequisite to the operation of the free expression
system's second stage, at least if that second stage is to operate with the
freedom from inhibition which has been firmly guaranteed to the first
stage.
One simple recognition of privacy's importance to self-governance
is the curtain on the voting booth. But the shelter of privacy is needed
for more than the casting of the formal vote, both because there are
other ways of registering self-governing choices and because the process
of reaching a decision does not take place only at the moment of formal
choice-registering; it is a continuous process which extends from the
receipt of each item of information from a speaker to each choice, for-
mal or informal, which the citizen registers.2 1 He who performs his lis-
tening and deciding functions in a glass house is coerced by public opin-
ion, whether anyone is actually looking in or not. If every magazine
20. See, e.g., Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353-54 (1939) (x-rays of
plaintiff's pelvis); Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845, 846 (1939) (plaintiff's
experience as holdup victim); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. Ap. 2d 70-1, 705, 211 P.2d 320.
321 (1949) (prizefighter's losing record); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. .85, 289.90, 297
P. 91, 92-93 (1931) (plaintiff's former career as prostitute); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Flb. 198,
207-11, 20 So. 2d 243, 247-48 (1945) (biographical sketch of plaintiff), Trammel v. Cititen
News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 531, 148 S.W.2d 708, 709 (1941) (plaintiff's debt to grocer). See
also Prosser, supra note 1, at 392-98. For criticism of the public disclosure tort, see Kalven,
supra note 7, at 333-39.
21. Cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 13, at 255-57.
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he reads, every rally he attends, every person he speaks to might some-
how become a matter of public knowledge, he would feel inhibiting
pressure. 22 The pressure is the same as that felt by a member of the
NAACP in Alabama when he fears that the fact of his membership will
be publicized. 23 The Court itself, in discussing the threat to First
Amendment freedoms which might result from the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee forcing one admitted Communist sympathizer
to identify others, has noted:
[T]hose who are identified by witnesses and thereby placed in the
same glare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma, scorn
and obloquy. Beyond that, there is the more subtle and immeasur-
able effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most orthodox
and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a simi-
lar fate .... 24
The effect described is the response of a citizen uncertain of his pri-
vacy as he goes about making self-governing decisions within the system
of freedom of expression. A more highly developed form of the same
coercion can be found in a citizenry watched over by a thought police,
where the threat-that the manifestations of an individual's thinking
will be collected and examined-is made overt.25 No curtailment of
the first stage of that system is necessary to erode it; inhibiting the sec-
ond stage is just as effective. And since the participants in the latter
stage are more numerous and more timid than speakers in the former,
effective methods of control can be less direct and less conspicuous than
those which successfully inhibit the first stage of the system's operation.
Not only the privacy of the decision-making process but also confi-
dence in that privacy is at stake; pulling back the curtain on one voter
22. The most eloquent statement of the point occurs in Bloustein, Prihacy as an Aspect
of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1003 (1964)[hereinafter cited as Bloustein, An Answer to Dean Prosser]. The mere collection of
such data may constitute an infringement of privacy even apart from the threat of
inhibition. See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 573, 255 N.-2d 765. 773.
307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 658 (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring). But see T. Eimiso.n, supra note
7, at 556.
23. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In that case the Supreme Court
said that
compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute
[an] . . . effective . . . restraint on freedom of association . . . . This Court has
recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's
association . . . . Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many cir-
cumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs.
Id. at 562. See also Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P.. 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
24. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957) (emphasis added).
25. For the effect on privacy of totalitarian government, see, e.g., A. Wfsn., PsvAc,,
&ND FRamEo. 23 (1967); Kalven, supra note 7, at 326.
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threatens others. 26 Thus, if a free expression system is to be main-
tained, the First Amendment has an interest in protecting the privacy
of the individual.
Assuming that privacy consists only in the individual's control of
information about himself-his keeping it from the knowledge of oth-
ers-then the First Amendment interest in that privacy will extend
only to certain types of information: that information which, if re-
leased, would inhibit the individual's freedom to reach decisions of
self-government. Perhaps this category is only a narrow one. But in free
speech cases involving libel suits, the Supreme Court has discovered
self-governing relevance in many kinds of information, not merely the
small category of information which has obvious "political" rele-
vance.27 It has held that the First Amendment has an interest in pro-
tecting published information whether it be opinion or fact,2 8 whether
the fact be true or false, 20 whether the subject of the information be
public official or private citizen,30 and whether the subject be well-
known or obscure. 31 If the inquiry is reversed and instead becomes
the First Amendment (i.e., self-governing) relevance of information
to the person whom it involves, it is hard to see how the Court could
take a narrower view. In both cases the question is what kinds of infor-
mation-what content-might have an effect on the self-governing deci-
sions of citizens, and the answer in both cases should be the same.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,32 for example, the Court held that publication
of James Hill's name in connection with the play based on his experi-
ences was privileged because, in effect, knowledge of that information
might be useful to the members of the public in arriving at decisions
of self-government. 33 But, James Hill should be able to claim, the
privacy of that information is also important to his decision-making;
when the information is exposed, he is inhibited. He might have
planned to accept public office as a special prosecutor of organized
26. The threat that many citizens will be inhibited through the direct inhibition
of only one is a well-established piece of First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Baird v.
State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603.04 (1967);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). But see Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972).
27. See note 15 supra. See also T. EMEaSON, supra note 7, at 540.41. But see Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INDIANA L.J. 1, 27 (1971).
28. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 25, 271-73 (1964).
29. Id. at 271-72.
30. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155, 163-64 (1967).
31. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971).
32. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
33. "We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of a new
play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest." Id. at 388.
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crime; now, the public's knowledge that his family has been held hos-
tage once before makes him fear that a mobster might think to try
it again. He might have been about to petition his elected represen-
tatives for lighter kidnapping penalties; now he would be ridiculed.
He intended to see the play himself; now he would be the center of
unwanted attention. Most important, his confidence in the privacy of
his life in general is shaken; if the fact that he was held hostage can be
told, what about his atheism, or his check to the Black Panthers3 4
The point is not that any item of news which is publishable is also
necessarily a valuable part of someone's privacy; it is that any type of
information has the potential to be either. The First Amendment has
an interest in protecting a broad range of speech; it has also a parallel
interest in protecting a broad range of privacy.
Both First Amendment interests are present in the paradigm public
disclosure tort situation,33 where a plaintiffs privacy claim will always
face the claim of the defendant publisher that the information pub-
lished is in the public interest and therefore is privileged. 30 Hence,
such cases would seem to pose a rare constitutional dilemma: the need
to choose between two opposing claims, both of which arise from the
same constitutional provision. Each party can demonstrate an injury
to the free expression system of self-government if the other is allowed
his way, and apparently one claim can be upheld only at the expense
of the other. The Court has not yet acknowledged this conflict; instead
it has automatically upheld the claim of the publisher when that claim
has substance. 37
34. None of these inhibitions by itself is overwhelming, and it might be argued that
they ought not to be taken into account at all in determining First Amendment free-
doms. Mr. Justice Black appears to take this view in Time, inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at
399-400 (concurring opinion). One can also deny that such inhibitions are possible, if
one believes that "'Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyaannical
government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind." Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), adopted as the ophinion of the Court in
Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
This Note does not argue that the inhibitions suggested should outweigh substantial
free speech interests of the publishers, but only that consideration should be given to
the inhibitory effect of allowing publication as well as to the inhibitory effect of pun-
ishing it. In cases where the free speech interest to the public is small, the privacy
interest to the individual might be relatively large. See pp. 1471-72 infra.
35. See p. 1462 supra.
36. The discussion is hypothetical because in no public disclosure case to date has
the constitutional defense been raised. The closest example is Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), in which a newsworthiness privilege was successfully
asserted; but because of the peculiarities of the New York "privacy" statute, that state
cannot be said to have a proper public disclosure tort action. See note 83 infra. The
most important defect of the New York law, from the standpoint of a public diclosure
tort action, is that truth is a defense. The same confusion arose in Time, Inc. V. Hill
and was discussed by Justice Fortas. His dissenting opinion stressed that the First Amend-
ment should not preclude the protection of a right of privacy. 385 U.S. at 412. See also
the concurring and dissenting opinion of justice Harlan, id. at 404.
37. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 US. 29, 48 (1971).
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One possible accommodation of the conflicting First Amendment
claims in the public disclosure case might be made by focusing on the
issue of names and separating them from the news items in which they
appear. The crux of an individual's privacy is not the disclosure of
private information by itself, but the linking of that information to the
individual in question, by name or otherwise. If it is possible that a
piece of information is relevant to the self-governing choices of the pub-
lic, but that the identity of the subject of that information is not, then
at least in such cases both claims can be satisfied.
For example, publishing the fact that a young woman in Kansas City
suffers from a disease of compulsive overeating does not infringe the
privacy of the woman; publishing her name and a photograph showing
her face certainly does.38 On the other hand, the value of that news
item to the self-governing public lies primarily in the fact of the dis-
ease and little if at all in the identification of the sufferer. The woman's
condition is medically interesting and the fact of its existence might be
relevant in reaching such decisions as whether to approve a hospital
bond issue. But at the same time, the fact that the woman is Mrs. Doro-
thy Barber might not have any relevance to the self-governing decisions
of the same public. Or, if it is somehow relevant, the relevance is of a
much lower order of magnitude.
Of course, there are cases in which the identity of a person involved
in a news event is itself relevant to the purposes of self-government, as
when the person holds public office or a place in the public eye.30
But in many cases, the identification of the subject of a published news
item is not of significant value; it is unlikely to have any effect on the
political choices which the reader will make. Most suits for injury
caused by public disclosure of private facts have focused on the single
issue of identification, conceding the public news value of a prostitute's
life,40 a genius' decline, 41 or schoolchildren's disruptive behavior,42
but claiming that the privilege to publish does not extent to the name
of the individuals involved when they are not themselves currently pub-
lic figures.
In public disclosure cases in which the plaintiff is not well-known,
38. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 SAV.2d 291 (1942). For a general
discussion, see Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 537, 483 P.2d 34, 40, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866, 872 (1971).
39. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360,
370 (1969). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
41. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
42. Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S. May 29, 1973).
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the First Amendment interest of the public, operating through the pub-
lisher, is satisfied by the publication of the fact or event; the First
Amendment interest of the subject is satisfied if the publisher refrains
from identifying him. Hence there is no constitutional objection to
preserving a tort remedy for the plaintiff if the publisher does identify
him and thereby injures his privacy. But this result can only be reached
if the constitutional privilege to tell the public a piece of news is judged
separately from the constitutional privilege to tell the public who was
involved. 43
Edward Bloustein has already suggested a similar method of accom-
modating the First Amendment and the public disclosure tort. He con-
ceives of the relevance issue as a limit on the First Amendment, thus
providing room beyond the boundaries of free speech for the operation
of privacy tort law.44 Privacy, in his view, takes up where the free ex-
pression system leaves off.4 5 But in the context developed above, Blou-
stein's formulation is incomplete. It is not enough to say that protection
will be allowed only in cases too trivial to enter the First Amendment
arena. The difficult and important cases are those in which the First
Amendment interests in privacy and speech compete. A court cannot
dispose of the First Amendment issue by deciding merely that the name
of an individual is "of legitimate public interest"; if it so decides, it
must then balance the resulting First Amendment interest in publica-
tion of the name with the First Amendment interest in protecting the
privacy of the individual.4 6 In doing so, it should consider the net effect
of allowing publication (or protecting privacy) on the free expression
system at large. The Court has said in other contexts that the constitu-
tional interest in unrestricted speech can be outweighed;4 7 in some
43. To reach such decisions, of course, courts must overcome the misleading slogan
that "names are news," which many have taken as a normative prescription. See Comment,
The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Neu'sworthiness,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 722 (1963). That "names are news" is apt commercial description
has been endlessly demonstrated, but commercial fact should be irrelevant to the con-
stitutional decision at stake: Does the name of a given person, linked to soeie informa-
tion, have value to those who hear or read the resulting news item, in that they will
find it useful in arriving at the decisions of self.government?
44. Bloustein, Privacy. Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Bjrandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 Tmxs L. Rav. 611. 625 (1908).
45. Though he deals with a privacy of broader definition, Emerson also suggests that
First Amendment rights and privacy rights should apply in mutually exclusive areas.
T. EmprsoN, supra note 7, at 548. For him as for Bloustein, the problem then becomes
one of drawing the boundary line.
46. Of course, if the court decides that the name is not "of legitimate public in-
terest," the publisher has no defense of privilege and the plaintiffs catie of action in
tort is good. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 2d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US. 568, 57142 (l942). Cf. Wright,
Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know, 46 Trx.s L. REv. 630. 634 (196S).
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cases it might well be outweighed by the First Amendment interest in
privacy.
Evaluating the constitutionality of a given public disclosure suit
should involve a calculation as to which result will best serve the system
of which both claimants are a part and to which both appeal. The cal.
culation may well come out in favor of publication, but it should be
a calculation and not a blanket assertion that the First Amendment is
always best served by the privileged publication of newsworthy items of
information. At least in the area of identification, as suggested above,
the calculation of effect on a free expression system might well produce
an opposite result. If so, a public disclosure tort action addressed to the
unauthorized use of names cannot be automatically invalidated under
the First Amendment. 48
II
The constitutional argument for the public disclosure tort suggests
solutions to two major problems in current privacy law. First, the argu-
ment provides a conceptual definition of the privacy interest at stake;
and second, it provides a doctrinal justification for protecting that in-
terest in law. Common law privacy doctrine has failed to supply either
of these. Prosser's definitive article on the common law of privacy estab-
lished public disclosure as one of the four recognized categories of tort
actions addressed to the protection of privacy.40 But Prosser's classifica-
tion, based on differences in the kind of injury involved, was only de-
scriptive; it offered no justification for the different types of recovery.
And though his categories have been widely influential, critics have
complained that his most original category-the public disclosure action
-lacks a conceptual foundation.50
Of Prosser's four categories of privacy actions, three rest on venerable
tort doctrine. False light is a homologue of libel; appropriation uses
the reasoning and damage measure of personal property law; and intru-
sion expands on the law of trespass quare clausum fregit.51 In each cate-
48. The tort might well be held unconstitutional as applied in a specific case. In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, the Alabama libel tort was so held. But
the tort was not and could not have been held unconstitutional on its face, and the same
would apply to the public disclosure tort in a constitutional challenge.
49. Prosser, supra note 1.
50. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 7, at 331-32.
51. For the relationship of false light and libel, see Wade, Defamation and the Right
of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962). See also Kalven, supra note 7, at 332, 339.41.
For the use of property concepts in appropriation cases, compare the majority with
the dissenting opinion in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.X.
442 (1902). See also O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (dis-
senting opinion). See generally Prosser, supra note 1; Bloustein, An Answer to Dean
Prosser, supra note 22.
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gory the central injury has long been recognized in law, and calling it
an injury to "privacy" is a semantic, not a legal, innovation. The public
disclosure tort, on the other hand, presents a true conceptual novelty:
the idea that mere publication of accurate data about a person might
cause him legal injury.52
The false light action protects against injuries to reputation only;
and, as with libel, truth is a defense. It therefore gives the individual
no right to control accurate information about himself. Any relation-
ship of the tort action to a concept of privacy is tenuous.
The action for appropriation of name or likeness protects against the
publication of true information about the individual, but it concerns
only that information on which the individual might have capitalized
himself. The injury is a commercial one; the action protects less a right
to privacy than a right to publicity.53 Since recovery under the appro-
priation tort depends on the economic injury suffered,54 those who suf-
fer the largest loss of privacy through publication of their names and
faces-those who have been utterly unknown before the publication-
stand to recover least. 5
The intrusion tort comes closer than false light or appropriation to
offering a satisfactory definition of privacy. It protects the individual's
right to control access to his immediate surroundings, and thus defines
52. Before the famous article by Warren and Brandeis appeared in 1890, this was a
suggestion virtually unheard in the law. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Seventy-five years later, the law still often fails to recognize injury to privacy in the
absence of trespass, bodily injury, theft, or money damages. See Ruebhausen & Brim,
Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REy. 118 1185 (1965). See generally I
F. HAmur' & F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 9.5, at 678-79 (1956).
53. Prosser, supra note 1, at 406-07. See also Nimmer. The Right of Publicity,
19 LAw & CONTFiP. PROB. 203 (1954); Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Inno-
vation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123 (1953).
54. There can be no economic measure of a genuine injury to privacy; the worth of
a man's privacy cannot vary with the commercial value of his name or face in the mar-
ketplace. Yet just this distortion has crept into nearly all privacy tort recoveries because
elements of appropriation actions have not been kept separate from those of other suits
classed under the privacy heading. See Bloustein, Atn Answer to Dean Prosser, supra
note 22, at 977-91.
Damage measure is a long-standing problem in privacy tort law which this Note does
not purport to solve. Justices Harlan and Fortas have suggested an actual or compen-
satory damage measure. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 66 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 885 U.S. 874, 420 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). But for
a discussion of the difficulty of measuring the extent of an injury to personality caused
by publication, see Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality; An Essay on Legal Regulation
of Public Communications, 46 TExAS L. REv. 650, 658-67 (1968). For criticism of privacy
damages as conjectural, see Kalven, supra note 7, at 834. For the observation that tie
injury for which privacy damages are supposed to compensate is irreparable, see Blou-
stein, An Answer to Dean Prosser, supra note 22, at 1002-03. See generally W. Pnosnsn,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 815 (4th ed. 1971).
55. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, California has recently imposed a minimum
liability of $300 for commercial use of a person's name, photograph, or likenesS. CAUr.
CIVIL CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1972). The appropriation tort is the only one of the
four privacy torts to be codified in state statutes. See W. PaossM, supra note 54, § 117,
at 805.
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privacy as control of physical space. Physical space is an important and
well-recognized element of privacy, and spatial metaphor dominates
legal thinking about the subject; for example, we most commonly refer
to any infringement of privacy as an "invasion." Yet on the basis of its
definition of privacy, the intrusion tort draws distinctions which seem
to have nothing to do with privateness. In Nader v. General Motors
Corp.,"0 for example, "mere gathering" of private information was held
not punishable unless the gatherer was "unreasonably intrusive."
Though Nader claimed that he was shadowed by detectives, that a
dossier on his private life was compiled through observation and inter-
views with acquaintances, and that his bank accounts and tax returns
were pried into, only wiretapping and eavesdropping were held to
give rise to a cause of action for intrusion.57
The public disclosure tort, by finding legal injury in the mere act
of publishing accurate data about a person, protects something which
is farther from traditional tort theory, and perhaps closer to a satisfac-
tory concept of privacy. The actual content of a person's privacy is a
subjective matter over which people inevitably disagree, but even as
they disagree they can share a common concept of how privacy works
and what purpose it serves. Scholars who have sought a conceptual defi-
nition of privacy have not been unanimous, but a common theme ap-
pears in many of their efforts: that privacy reflects a psychological need
of the individual to keep some core of personality to himself, outside
the notice of society.58 The ultimate value at stake has been variously
described-human dignity, individuality, and autonomy have been sug-
gested-but in each description the point is that it is kept from the
awareness of others at the will of the individual.0 Nor is privacy sim-
ply rigid secrecy; it is essential that the individual be free to reveal
parts of his selfhood to chosen others.0 0 Charles Fried considers this gift
of selfhood to be the essence of relationships of love, friendship, trust,
and respect, and argues that these intimate relationships cannot exist
without the confidence of the individual that only his chosen intimates
will possess intimate knowledge of him; in other words, intimacy de-
pends on the inaccessibility of one's private self to society at large. 0'
56. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
57. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 564-71, 255 N.E.2d 765, 767-71, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650.56 (1970).
58. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDION 22-78 (1958); E. GOFFMAN, THE I'RSENTAION
OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); A. VsrIN, supra note 25, at 8-63; Bloustein, Ant Anucr
to Dean Prosser, supra note 22, at 1002-03; Arnold Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated
Freedom, '13 NOMOS 71, 72-74 (1971); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 52, at 205. Sce
also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
59. See note 58 supra.
60. Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEMp, Po. 281,
281-83 (1966).
61. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
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Control of information about oneself is thus the essence of privacy:
"the claim of individuals .. to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to oth-
ers. '' 62 The public disclosure tort action-which punishes the unjusti-
fied exposure through mass publication of the data of an individual's
life-contains the only direct recognition which the law has given to
that non-libel, non-territorial, non-commercial claim.63
III
Constitutional law shares the conceptual weakness of common law
in the privacy area. The Supreme Court has declared that the Consti-
tution protects a right to privacy, but the supporting analysis offers no
hint as to how that protected privacy might be defined. Other consti-
tutional grounds which have been set forth present better possibilities
of definition, but the rights so defined are far too narrow and qualified
to serve as a satisfactory "right to privacy."
As the opinions in the recent abortion cases0 4 confirm, the Court's
primary analytical model of privacy is that which appears in the plural-
ity opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticult.0 In
Griswold, Justice Douglas collected the various existing constitutional
doctrines which might be considered to protect some specific interest
in privacy-including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Four-
teenth Amendments-and, rather than relying on any one of them,
declared that their sum resulted in a constitutional interest in privacy
in general. 0 Justice Douglas' argument, though in form an argument
by analogy to existing constitutional rights, 7 in effect contended for
the establishment of a new and independent constitutional right. The
protection of privacy is incident to several constitutional goals; there-
fore it should be a goal itself. The formula reflects the belief of Pro-
62. A. WAEsnN, supra note 25, at 7. Similar definitions are offered in Ruebhausen "
Brim, supra note 52, at 1189-90, and Shils, supra note 60, at 282.
63. If courts come to accept the separate doctrinal underpinning of the public dis-
closure tort, they can begin to untangle some of the confusions of pri%2cy law in general,
an area whose state of organization one judge has likened to "a haystack in a hurri-
cane." Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481, -185 (3d Cir. 1956) (Biggi,
C.J.). Plaintiffs would be able to seek relief directly for injuries to their privacy w'ithout
having to claim injury to reputation or pocketbook as the) often must at present. Sec note
52 supra. Hybrid privacy actions would cease to distort libel law. Cf. Wade, supra note
51. See also Kalven, supra note 7, at 335. Finally, courts would be able consistently to
separate economic injury from injury to privacy and relegate them to separate causes of
action. Cf. note 54 supra.
64. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. CL 705 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
65. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66. Griswold, 581 U.S. at 480-86.
67. See Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment As Civil Law Method and its Ins-
plication for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 40 TULmNE L. REv. 487, 490-91 (1966).
1475
The Yale Law Journal
Lessor Emerson, who argued the case for the Griswold plaintiffs before
the Supreme Court, that only a newly declared constitutional right
which "cuts across" other constitutional rights can adequately protect
individual privacy.6 8
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment argu-
ment of Griswold-perhaps streamlined in Roe v. Wade to a Fourteenth
Amendment argument alone 69-presents the advantage of breadth.
However, the definitions of privacy which the Griswold approach of-
fers are at best descriptions of a widely shared emotional attitude.10
Analytically, the reasoning of Griswold and Wade offers no guidance
for separating what privacy is from what it is not; it offers no generaliz-
able definition of the right it is used to protect. Indeed, the extreme
breadth of the Griswold analysis has produced utmost caution in courts
called on to apply it,71 and even Wade extends the resulting right only
within the area of intimate bodily conduct. Confining the right to pri-
vacy inside that area is sanctioned by custom, but not by anything in the
reasoning of the decisions.
An alternative to the form of argument which identifies privacy as
a wholly new constitutional right is one which discovers that privacy
is incident to a constitutional right already well established. If that
established right is to be fully realized, the argument runs, privacy in
some form must be protected. Each of the doctrines which Douglas col-
68. T. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 556. Professor Emerson's brief in Griswold Invoked
the First Amendment in support of a constitutional right to privacy, but it did so only
in a limited context. Brief for Appellants at 79-80, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). There is no suggestion that a constitutional right to privacy might rest on the
First Amendment or its system of freedom of expression; indeed, the First Amendment
was not included in the summary list of constitutional provisions from which a right
to privacy was said to emanate. Id. at 12.
69. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 727, 733-36 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) id. at
755 (Burger, C.J., concurring). But cf. id. at 737-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Two of the
Griswold opinions also located the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 381 U.S. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502-03
(White, J., concurring).
70. The most familiar such definition of privacy is "the right to be let alone." See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (Goldberg. J., concurring), quoting Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg of-
fers another in Griswold. "the integrity of [family] life." 381 U.S. at 495. Cf. Justice
Black's attack in Griswold on the dangers of defining privacy too narrowly, 381 U.S.
at 509 (dissenting opinion).
More usually, the Court's attempted definitions of privacy reflect only the Court's
own sense that the subject is important. Examples of these include "the right most
valued by civilized men," Griswol , 381 gU.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring), quoting
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); "a right . . . older than the Bill
of Rights," Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; and "personal rights 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,'" Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. at 726, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
71. See T. EMERSON, supra note 7. at 557. Cf. Hufstedler, The Directions and Mis.
directions of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 REcoRD or N.Y.C.B.A. 546, 559 n.59
(1971).
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lected in Griswold offers such an analysis.72 And though Griswold may
stand for the proposition that no one of them alone is adequate to sup-
port a right to privacy,7" one in particular has seemed promising.
In her 1971 Cardozo Lecture, Judge Shirley Hufstedler set out an
argument for deriving a broad constitutional protection of privacy
from the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.74 Judge Hufstedler argued that the Fourth Amendment (and
to a lesser extent the Fifth as well) was drafted to prevent penetrations
of individual privacy, and that to realize that goal a broad interpreta-
tion should be given to the words "searches and seizures."
Were that course taken, any governmental probe, corporeal or in-
corporeal, designed to uncover or to disclose information about
a person would be a "search." The question whether the search
iwas permissible would turn on its reasonableness.7"
In effect, Judge Hufstedler proposed a constitutional analogue to the
torts of intrusion and appropriation.
A Fourth Amendment "right to privacy,"70 however, does not protect
the substance of one's privacy; it merely prevents certain methods of
obtaining that substance.77 A reasonable search or seizure would pre-
sumably be constitutional no matter what the content of the private
information revealed, nor would the content of that information neces-
sarily affect the judgment of what is reasonable. In other words, the
Fourth Amendment offers no definition of the content of its right to
privacy, other than a reflexive one: it is that which is violated by an
unreasonable search or seizure. Although the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly denied that the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of
places rather than people, it has yet to produce a Fourth Amendment
holding which does not depend on the nature of the place where the
unreasonable search or seizure took place. To the extent that privacy
72. These include the types of privacy protected by the First, Third. Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, 381 U.S. at 484. Douglas seems to gloss over the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 482. He does not do more with the Ninth Amend-
ment than to quote it. Id. at 484.
73. The First Amendment rights which Douglas recounts-freedom of schooling and
freedom of association-are subordinate to the express free speech guarantee, and they
act to secure it. The Third Amendment protects the privacy of the home, if at all,
only against the specific threat of being forced to quarter soldiers in peacetime. The
Fourth Amendment protects privacy only as an incident to the prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment's "zone of privacy" is sub-
ordinate to the operation of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
74. Hufstedler, supra note 71.
75. Id. at 561-62.
76. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 US. 745, 751, 752 (1971).
77. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
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means something other than that which happens in private places, a
Fourth Amendment rationale is inadequate to protect it.78
Both the Griswold doctrine and the narrower doctrines which go to
make it up reflect the Supreme Court's concern with the protection of
individual privacy, and all of them help to protect privacy to some
extent. But each fails to provide an adequate concept of the nature of
privacy: how it arises, and what its characteristics are. Until the Court
can say what privacy is, at least in conceptual terms, constitutional pro-
tection of privacy will be haphazard.
IV
Although the First Amendment analysis of the public disclosure tort
generates a conception of privacy which comes closer than the concep-
tions of current tort and constitutional law to describing what privacy
is and to making it susceptible to the application of legal doctrine,
the claim which results is limited. The analysis discovers only a con-
stitutional interest in privacy, not a constitutional right to have it pro-
tected in all cases. It does not yield a "First Amendment right to pri-
vacy" which can be placed next to the constitutional privacy rights
which already exist.79
The first drawback to asserting the interest as a "right" is the narrow
boundary within which it can be applied. It arises only within the con-
stitutional structure of a free expression system. And in every case
of public disclosure, the publisher has access to free expression claims
which also serve the system. Since the individual's privacy is secured
only at the expense of the free speech right of the publisher, it cannot
grow too large. The First Amendment privacy interest is only in pre-
venting the identification of an individual with information published,
78. This proposition might appear to be contradicted by Katz v. United States,
which extended protection to a public telephone booth. But the Court held that Katz
was protected against being overheard in a public telephone booth because he "Justi-
fiably relied" on the booth to protect his privacy; in other words, he temporarily con-
stituted a private space from an apparently public one. Id. at 352-53. The dlistinction
is made clearer in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), in which the Court held
that Katz did not apply to an informer who takes a concealed transmitter into a sus-
pect's home. Though the suspect obviously relied on the privacy of his home in talking
to the informer, the Court found his reliance unreasonable. Id. at 753. Under the Fourth,
Amendment, privacy seems to depend on what one ought to expect about the charac-
teristics of one's surroundings. If, on the other hand, the Court in White was considering
privacy to be the control of information about oneself, its holding means that limited
dissemination of information about oneself is unprotected; if you tell one person, every-
one has a right to know. But recall Fried's discussion of the value of being able to limit
the sharing of private information, note 61 supra.
79. For a summary of the Court's many constitutional privacy rights, see Roe v.
Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726-27 (1973).
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and even then only after weighing the net effect on the free expression
system.8 0
The second drawback is a state action problem. Since it is a private
publisher who most often threatens to infringe individual privacy
through a publication, the individual probably cannot assert his con-
stitutional claim against that publisher directly; 8' he must rely on the
indirect protection of a common law tort suit s2 after the offending
publication.8 3 Moreover, not all states recognize a public disclosure
tort in their common law;8 4 in those which do not, the individual
would have no mechanism at all through which to assert his claim for
protection. A "First Amendment right to privacy" would thus depend
for its existence on state courts or legislatures, a situation which the
Court-if it were to recognize the "right" at all-would be unlikely to
find satisfactory.8
Though a First Amendment analysis does not by itself justify the
enforcement of a constitutional right to privacy, it nevertheless under-
scores the weaknesses of existing constitutional privacy doctrine. The
analysis directs attention to the one form of privacy which the law,
both common and constitutional, has so far been unable to protect suc-
cessfully: the non-corporeal, non-quantifiable right to control of infor-
mation about oneself, based on the content of the information rather
80. See pp. 1470-72 supra.
81. If a state agency is the publisher, presumably the publication is state action.
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961). In that
event, the individual could assert his First Amendment rights against the state directly,
claiming state inhibition of his freedom of decision-making.
82. If the public disclosure tort were codified in state statute, it might be argued
that a refusal by state courts to enforce the resulting state right of privacy might itself
be sufficient state action to create federal jurisdiction. At present, however, the public
disclosure tort exists only at common law. See generally A. PRossR, THE Lw or ToeTs§ 117, at 809-12 (4th ed. 1971).
83. Nothing in this discussion is intended to suggest the propriety of a prior restraint
of the publisher. Cf. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
US. 713 (1971).
The individual's dependence on state laws to protect his federal constitutional rights
is less startling than it seems; even the right to free speech depends to an extent on
state laws prohibiting, for example, assault and battery. If a speaker were not protected
by state law against being pummeled every time he opened his mouth, or if a news-
paper or radio station could not use state law to prevent its equipment from being
destroyed by a displeased audience, freedom of speech and of the press would be ef-
fectively curtailed.
84. The number of states which recognize something like a public disclosure tort is
uncertain. See note 3 supra. Some states, however, explicitly refuse to do so. New York,
for example, has consistently refused to recognize such a right since the decision of
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902): instead the
state legislature passed a statute, N.Y. Ctv. Ricirrs L.,,w §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948), which
more nearly fits the pattern of an appropriation tort. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 401.
Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411-20 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
85. C7f. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1965), citing Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
US. 331, 335 (1946).
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than the circumstances of its escape from one's control. Furthermore,
the analysis suggests how privacy in that form might be integrated into
a system of constitutional rights. The focus on the importance for pri-
vacy of information qua information, without regard to whether its
content is specifically sexual or not, is perhaps the distinguishing con-
tribution to privacy analysis of the First Amendment approach.
A First Amendment analysis of privacy teaches that an application
of First Amendment guarantees exclusively to speakers will not ade-
quately protect a free expression system; decision-makers must be shel-
tered, too. For the protection of privacy, the analysis yields a constitu-
tional interest which cannot always be vindicated because it must com-
pete with conflicting constitutional interests arising from the same
logic. Yet it is the nature of privacy to be entangled with other social
interests and values;86 privacy in law cannot be less entangled with and
compromised by other legal goals. The First Amendment analysis of
privacy makes these entanglements and compromises explicit.
86. See, e.g., Simmel, supra note 58.
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